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Abstract: The unattended nature of wireless sensor networks makes them very vulnerable 
to malicious attacks. Therefore, how to preserve secure data collection is an important 
issue to wireless sensor networks. In this paper, we propose a novel approach of secure 
data  collection  for  wireless  sensor  networks.  We  explore  secret  sharing  and  multipath 
routing to achieve secure data collection in wireless sensor network with compromised 
nodes.  We  present  a  novel  tracing-feedback  mechanism,  which  makes  full  use  of  the 
routing functionality of wireless sensor networks, to improve the quality of data collection. 
The  major  advantage  of  the  approach  is  that  the  secure  paths  are  constructed  as  a  
by-product of data collection. The process of secure routing causes little overhead to the 
sensor  nodes  in  the  network.  Compared  with  existing  works,  the  algorithms  of  the 
proposed approach are easy to implement and execute in resource-constrained wireless 
sensor networks. According to the result of a simulation experiment, the performance of 
the approach is better than the recent approaches with a similar purpose. 
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1. Introduction 
Although intrusion detection is an important issue to wireless sensor networks (WSNs), it is still in its 
infancy and there are currently only a few of studies in this area. Due to the intrinsic features of WSNs, it 
is difficult to perform efficient intrusion detection in such a resource-restricted environment [1]. Many 
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intelligent or statistical approaches are too complex for resource-constrained WSNs. In contrast, it is 
much easier to elude or bypass malicious nodes rather than detect them. One possible solution to such 
kinds of attacks is to exploit the routing functionality of WSNs. If the locations of the malicious nodes 
(also called compromised nodes) are known a priori, then sensed information can be delivered over 
paths that circumvent (bypass) malicious nodes, whenever possible. As the existing intrusion detection 
methods for WSN are still immature, in practice it is difficult to acquire such location information 
precisely. Therefore, the above idea of delivering information is often implemented in a probabilistic 
manner. Multipath routing allows the establishment of multiple paths between a single source and 
single destination node. It is typically proposed in order to increase the reliability of data transmission 
(i.e., fault tolerance) or to provide load balancing [2]. If the location information of compromised 
nodes is not known a priori, the source node can deliver sensed information by multiple paths to 
decrease the chance of the information being intercepted. 
However, there are still problems with the multipath routing approach. If adversary can selectively 
compromise sensor nodes, sensed information is intercepted in each fixed routing path even if it can be 
distributed  over  different  routes.  One  possible  solution  to  this  problem  is  delivering  information 
randomly through different paths rather than a fixed set of routes [3]. Although an adversary can still 
intercept part of the information, we can reduce the probability of interception to an acceptable extent 
using specific methods. 
In this paper, we propose a novel approach of secure data collection for WSNs. We explore secret 
sharing and multipath routing to achieve secure data collection in a WSN with compromised nodes. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the related works. 
In Section 3, we present an adaptive multi-path data collection algorithm for WSNs. In Section 4, we 
propose a feedback-based secure path algorithm for secure data collection in WSNs. We evaluate the 
approach with a simulation experiment in Section 5 and discuss the simulation results in detail. Section 
6 concludes the paper with an outlook to future research directions. 
2. Related Works 
There  have  been  a  few  on-going  research  efforts  concerning  multipath  routing  for  secure  data 
collection presented in literature. For example, the SPREAD algorithm in [4] is used to find multiple 
most-secure and node-disjoint paths. A modified Dijkstra algorithm is used to find the top-K most 
secure node-disjoint paths iteratively. The H-SPREAD algorithm [5] improves the SPREAD algorithm 
by simultaneously accounting for both security and reliability requirements. The work in [6] presents 
distributed Bound-Control and Lex-Control algorithms, which compute multiple paths respectively. 
Shu et al. in [3] presented an approach for secure data collection by using a (t, n)-threshold secret 
sharing algorithm and randomized multipath routes. A packet is broken into shares, which are sent to 
the  sink  through  randomly  generated  paths.  In  their  simulation,  they  use  a  fixed  source  node  to 
evaluate the approach in simulation, while we extend their simulation with a collection of source 
nodes. Nasser and Chen in [7] propose a routing protocol that uses multipath alternately as the path for 
communicating between two nodes. The protocol defends against some specific attacks like selective 
forwarding  by  advertising  an  attractive  route  to  the  destination.  Deng  et  al.  in  [8]  propose  an  
intrusion-tolerant routing protocol for WSNs. They try to preserve WSN security by using one way Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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hash chains and nested keyed message authentication codes, as well as multipath routing. Yao et al.  
in [9] presented a multipath secure routing protocol for WSNs. However, their approach requires the 
acknowledgement between every pair of nodes in routing. Therefore, it will cause large overhead to 
the data collection of the WSN. 
Compared  with  the  existing  works  in  this  field,  our  approach  use  a  novel  tracing-feedback 
mechanism, which makes full use of the routing functionality of WSNs to improve the quality of data 
collection. The secure paths here are potentially safe for data collection. Therefore, routing via secure 
paths is much more secure than random multipath routing. The major difference between our approach 
and  the  existing  multipath  methods  is  that  the  process  of  constructing  secure  paths  causes  little 
overhead  to  sensor  nodes  and  the  algorithms  are  easy  to  implement  and  perform  in  resource-
constrained WSNs. 
3. Multipath Data Collection 
Multipath routing has been used for different purposes in WSNs, such as load balancing, energy 
efficiency [10,11], etc. In this paper, we make use of multipath routing for secure data collection. We 
use a (t, n)-threshold secret sharing algorithm, e.g., Shamir’s algorithm [12], to encode a sensed data 
packet. When a sensor node wants to send a packet to a destination node (often the sink), it first breaks 
the packet into N shares according to the secret sharing algorithm. Each share is then transmitted to 
some randomly picked neighbor. The (t, n)-threshold secret sharing algorithm is illustrated as follows: 
(1)  Without loss of generality, we assume that the data is denoted by a number D. We choose a 
number p larger than both D and n. 
(2)  We generate a collection of coefficients a1, a2, …, at−1 from [0, p) and construct a t − 1 
degree polynomial q(x) = a0 + alx + ... + at−1x
t−1, in which a0 = D. 
(3)  We evaluate D1 = q(1), D2 = q(2), ..., Dn = q(n). Here Di denotes i
th share of the data. 
(4)  We deliver different shares to different objects. 
(5)  Given  any  subset  of  t  of  these  Di  values,  we  can  calculate  the  coefficients  of  q(x)  by 
interpolation, and then evaluate D = q(0). However, t − 1 (or less) of these values does not 
suffice in order to calculate D. 
Therefore, we can break a data packet into a collection of shares by using the (t, n)-threshold secret 
sharing algorithm and deliver different shares via different routing path (see Figure 1). We can extend 
existing multipath routing algorithms like AOMDV [13], SMR [14] to achieve secure routing in WSNs. 
Moreover, we intend to find as many routing paths as possible for a source node rather than using a set 
of disjoint paths like in AOMDV and SMR. We extend the algorithm given in [3] to generate routing 
path randomly for data collection. A data packet is broken into shares according to the (t, n)-threshold 
secret sharing algorithm and shares are transmitted to the sink via different paths. The algorithm in [3] 
does not consider the density of the sensor nodes in a WSN. If the degree or the number of neighbors 
of a node is small, there may be not enough candidates for delivering shares. Moreover, different 
nodes in a WSN have different degree values, a fixed (t, n)-threshold cannot satisfy every node in the 
WSN. We extend the algorithm in [3] with an adaptive (t, n)-threshold that varies according to the 
degree of node. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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Figure 1. A WSN with secret sharing mechanism for data collection. 
 
The adaptive data collection (ADC) algorithm is illustrated as follows: 
(1)  To a source node S that intends to send a data packet D, if its degree is larger than a threshold 
value k, we set n to the degree of the node, which is the number of the neighbors of the node. 
Moreover, we set t to a number that is less than n. Otherwise, the node sends D by normal 
routing until D reaches a node with enough degree. 
(2)  We break D into n shares according to the (t, n)-threshold secret sharing algorithm.  
(3)  For  each  share,  we  perform  node  selection  using  one  of  the  four  distributed  random 
propagation mechanisms in [3]. 
(4)  In this way, the shares of D are forwarded by a collection of relay nodes until they reach  
the sink.  
In the algorithm above, we consider the degree of sensor nodes. If the degree of a sensor node is 
small, it is not necessary to break a data packet into shares. We use an adaptive mechanism to control 
process of breaking data packet into shares. We will forward a data packet until it reaches a node that 
has a degree value large enough for (t, n)-threshold algorithm. In order to distinguish data shares and 
the original data packet, we should add an additional flag in the beginning of the data packet (see 
Figure 2). The data packet also contains a routing sequence field LR (used later).  
Figure 2. The structure of the data packet. 
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4. Secure Path Algorithm 
In  this  paper,  we  consider  a  relatively  simple  WSN  model.  Each  sensor  node  in  the  WSN  is  
battery-powered and has limited sensing, computation and wireless communication capabilities. The 
sink is a data collection center equipped with sufficient computation and storage capabilities. Sensor 
nodes generate sensed information and aggregate data packets. The sink collects data from sensor 
nodes periodically. The routing layer of WSNs is threatened by various attacks. However, due to the 
focus of this paper, it will not be further discussed and here we consider only attacks of packet dropping 
like  selective  forwarding  and  black  hole.  We  assume  that  compromised  nodes,  in  order  to  allay 
suspicions, selectively drop only a small proportion of all packets passing by rather than every packet. If 
a compromised node drops every packet, it is a black hole, which can also be handled by our approach.  
The process of data collection in WSN is a relay of data packets from the source node to the sink. 
The approach in this manuscript is mainly based on an assumption that if a data packet from the 
source successfully arrives at the sink, the path from the source to the sink is more likely to be 
safe for subsequent data collection. Therefore, we can make use of such historical information about 
data collection to improve the quality of the data collection and even perform intrusion detection. 
4.1. Feedback-Based Secure Path Construction 
Here we propose a feedback-based secure path construction (FSPC) algorithm to support secure 
data  collection.  We  try  to  use  a  tracing/feedback  mechanism  for  this  purpose.  The  algorithm  is 
illustrated as follows: 
(1)  A source node S sends a data packet according to the ADC algorithm. To each share of data 
packet, S attaches an identity list LR to it. Initially, LR is empty. 
(2)  When a sensor node Sk receives a share, if it is a normal node, it adds its identity dk to LR (it is 
possible that compromised nodes also do so in order to disguise themselves). 
(3)  On the arrival of the share, the sink extracts LR = {d1, d2, …, dn} (di refers to the identity of 
the node Si) from the share and stores it in its local database. Here LR is called a secure path 
in this case. 
(4)  The sink adds LR to a notification packet (see figure 3) and sends the packet to S according to 
LR. The notification packet contains the secure path for data collection. 
Figure 3. The structure of the notification packet. 
 
(5)  When a sensor node Sj receives the packet, if its identity dj is within LR, it extracts a sub-
path Pj = {dj+1, dj+2, …, dn} from LR and stores it into its local cache. Sj extracts its next-hop 
node Sj-1 with identity dj-1 from LR and forwards the packet to it. Pj is also called a sub-path 
of the secure path LR for Sj. 
(6)  On the arrival of the packet, S extracts LR from the packet, and stores it in its local cache 
(see figure 4). Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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Figure 4. An illustration of the FSPC algorithm for secure data collection. 
 
In this algorithm, each normal sensor node in a routing path adds its unique identity to the data 
packet. When the data packet reaches the sink, it involves a routing path that consists of a list of the 
identities of normal sensor nodes. It means that the path is potentially safe for data collection and can 
be used again by the source node in the future. A complete secure path is always terminated and 
collected by the sink. Here we use a feedback mechanism to notify the source node that requires the 
path for future data collection. The sink sends back a notification packet that contains a secure path to 
the source node. The task of notification is at intervals rather than immediately in order to reduce the 
overhead of the WSN. We can formally represent a secure path as a triple <S, LR, C>, where S is the 
source node for the path, LR is the identity list and C is a counter with an initial value λ (λ > 0). The 
value of C denotes the trust value for a secure path and a path with larger counter value is safer. 
The secure path LR from the source node S to the sink is a complete path for data collection. 
Therefore, it is called a global secure path. The secure path Pj from an intermediate node to the sink is 
a part of the global secure path, so it is called local secure path. Local secure paths can be extracted 
from a global path. With FSPC, we can get one global secure path as well as a collection of local 
secure paths. For example, a source node a wants to send data to the destination node g (see figure 5). 
Assume node e is a compromised node. Then the path {b, c, d, f, g} is a complete secure path. Paths 
like {d, f, g} are local secure paths. 
Figure 5. A simple example for secure path in WSN. 
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Here the notion of secure path does not mean that the path is safe for data collection. A secure path 
may include compromised nodes. This is mainly because that a compromised node drops a data packet 
with a probability. If a compromised node does not drop any data packet during the process of secure 
path construction, it will be considered potentially safe and be included in the path. In the worst case, 
each compromised node does not drop the data packet on the stage of secure path construction, in 
order to be involved in a secure path. Then each compromised node will appear on a secure path, 
which leads to a very low success ratio of data transmission. Therefore, when we say a path is a secure 
path, it only means that the path is currently safe for data collection. 
4.2. Secure-Path based Data Collection 
As long as a source node receives enough secure paths from the sink, it is able to send data via these 
paths. Therefore we can improve the ADC algorithm in Section 3 by using secure paths. The secure-
path based data collection (SPDC) algorithm is illustrated as follows: 
(1)  When a source node S intends to send a data share to the sink, it first checks its local cache. If 
there are secure paths, it selects a secure path P = <S, LR, C> with the largest counter value 
from its local data repository. S adds LR = {d1, d2,…, dn} to the beginning of the data share. If 
there  are  no  secure  paths  in  the  local  cache  of  the  relay  node,  it  just  performs  random 
multipath  routing  as  the  ADC algorithm in  Section 3. If S has no secure paths at all, it 
performs path construction as the FSPC algorithm in Section 4.1. 
(2)  Before sending the share, S first checks whether the node S1 with identity d1 is in its neighbor 
list. If the node is not in the list, it just performs random multipath routing. Otherwise, it 
sends the share to the node S1 with d1.  
(3)  When a sensor node Sk receives a share, it first checks whether there is any secure path in the 
head  of  the  share.  If  not,  it  performs  random  multipath  routing  and  path  construction. 
Otherwise, it checks whether the node Sk + 1 with identity dk + 1 is in its neighbor list. If the 
node is not the list, it just performs random multipath routing. Otherwise, it sends the share to 
the node Sk + 1 with dk + 1. 
If the share reaches the sink successfully: 
(4)  On the arrival of the share, if there is a secure path in the share, it means every relay node has 
used the path and the sink just sends back an empty notification to S. Otherwise, the sink 
extracts the identity list as a new secure path from the share, updates its local database, and 
sends back a notification with the newly-constructed secure path to S. 
(5)  The relay nodes on the path update their local cache with sub-paths.  
(6)  On the arrival of the notification, S extracts new secure path (if any) from the packet, and 
stores it in its local cache.  
If the share is dropped or does not reaches the sink within the time span allowed: 
(7)  S does not receive a notification from the sink, and then it just decreases the counter of P by 1.  
(8)  If the counter of a secure path is cleared, S will remove it from its local cache. S will resend 
the share if possible. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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From this algorithm, we can see that a secure path is not considered secure all the time. Secure 
paths are evaluated by their quality of service (QoS) for data collection. The SPDC algorithm deals 
with selective forwarding attacks by using a scoring mechanism. In this way, we can exclude as many 
compromised nodes as possible from data collection. The local cache for secure paths of a source node 
therefore changes dynamically to support more secure data collection in WSN. 
5. Simulation 
In this section, we construct a simulation to evaluate the performance of the proposed approach. 
The major metric for performance evaluation is the packet interception probability (PIP) for a source 
node, defined as the ratio of the number of intercepted data packets to the total number of packets from 
the source node. To better understand the capability of the randomized multi-path routing algorithms 
in  bypassing  black  holes,  we  also  compare  the  performance  of  our  approach  with  the  original 
algorithms in [3]. The basic setting for the simulation is illustrated in Table 1. Here the parameter drop 
rate refers to the probability that a compromised node drops a data packet. 
Table 1. The major parameters for the simulation. 
Parameter  Value 
Number of Sensor Nodes   50 
Threshold Value k  5 
Drop Rate  0.2 
Initial Counter Value λ  3 
Number of Source Nodes in a Collection  10 
5.1. Packet Interception Probability Evaluation 
We first fix the location of a source node that sends data to the sink. We first investigate the PIP for 
the source node under different numbers of compromised nodes. To each number of compromised 
nodes, we evaluate the average PIP for the source node. Figure 6(a) shows a plot of the PIP for the 
source node under different numbers of compromised nodes. It is obvious to see that the PIP increases 
when  the  number  of  compromised  nodes  becomes  larger.  When  half  of  the  sensor  nodes  are 
compromised nodes, most of the data packets are intercepted. We also compare the performance of the 
SPDC algorithm (including ADC and FSPC) with that of NRRP algorithm proposed in [3]. As can be 
seen  in  the  figure,  the  performance  of  SPDC  is  better  than  NRRP  with  the  same  number  of 
compromised nodes. When the number of compromised nodes is very small or large, the performance 
of the two algorithms is very close. However, SPDC behaves much better than NRRP with the number 
of compromised nodes falling into the extent (13, 18). 
Moreover,  we  also  compare  the  performance  of  SPDC  with  H-SPREAD  [5],  SEEM  [7]  and 
INSENS [8]. We change the number of the sensor nodes to 100 and evaluate PIP under different 
numbers of compromised nodes (see Figure 7). Here H-SPREAD is implemented with T = 9, and  
M = 3. INSENS is implemented with two paths, and one base station. It can be seen from the figure 
that the over performance of SPDC is better than the other three approaches. SPDC behaves much 
better than the other approaches with the number of compromised nodes falling into the extent (20, 40). Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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Figure 6. The simulation results for the performance evaluation of SPDC. 
 
Figure 7. The performance of SPDC against H-SPREAD, SEEM and INSENS. 
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5.2. Performance Evaluation with Source Node Set 
The work in [3] performs simulation by using a fixed source node that sends data to the sink. Using 
only a fixed source node is not enough to simulate the behaviors of WSNs. In practice, data is always 
generated by different sensor nodes distributed across an area. It is insufficient to evaluate the PIP with a 
fixed source node. In fact, our approach can achieve better performance as long as there is secure path 
from the source node to the sink. Therefore, we evaluate the overall PIP with a collection of source 
nodes. We select a collection of source nodes and each one is likely to generate data and send it to the 
sink. Then we evaluate the overall performance for our approach for the collection of source nodes. 
The process of simulation with a collection of source nodes is similar with that of a fixed source 
node. We evaluate the data collection algorithms for each source node in the collection and record the 
accumulative result for the collection. Here the number of the source nodes in the collection is 10 (see 
Table 1). As can be seen in Figure 6(b), the performance of SPDC is better than DRP and NRRP with 
the same number of compromised nodes. However, the advantage of SPDC is not very obvious against 
the other algorithms in this situation. The performance of DRP and NRRP is close to SPDC. 
5.3. Performance Evaluation under Different Drop Ratios 
We change the drop rate of compromised nodes to different values and evaluate the performance of 
the approach under different drop rate values. A larger drop rate implies that more data packets will be 
dropped by compromised nodes. Therefore, the PIP is more likely to increase when the drop rate value 
increases. As illustrated in Figure 6(c), both SPDC and NRRP achieve a higher PIP value when we 
change the drop rate from 0.2 to 0.5. 
It can be seen that the performance of SPDC is better than NRRP when the drop rate value is large. 
The performance of SPDC at drop rate of 0.5 is close to that at 0.2. In the contrast, the overall PIP of 
NRRP increases a lot when the drop rate changes from 0.2 to 0.5. It means that the performance of 
NRRP is poor when the drop rate is high. With a large drop rate value, it is easier for SPDC to exclude 
compromised  nodes  from  secure  paths  in  the  beginning,  which  results  in  a  better  performance. 
However, to NRRP, a large drop rate value just increase the number of data packets being dropped. 
Therefore, SPDC performs better than NRRP when the drop rate is high. 
5.4. Hop Count Evaluation 
We also evaluate the average number of hops of the end-to-end route generated by the approach. 
We fix the number of compromised nodes to 10 and evaluate the average hop count for each algorithm 
with the same number of data collection tasks. Figure 6(d) depicts a plot of the average hop count for 
the data collection with different algorithms. It can be seen that the overall performance of SPDC is 
better than DRP and NRRP. It takes fewer hops by using SPDC to perform data collection. 
As long as a secure path is constructed, subsequent data packets will be sent through the path. It is 
no need to perform random routing any more. The SPDC algorithm reduces additional random data 
packet forwarding in random dispersive algorithms like DRP and NRRP. Therefore, the hop count of 
data collection with SPDC is much fewer than that with DRP or NRRP. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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5.5. Transmission Delay Evaluation 
Although we can enhance the security of data collection in a WSN by using methods like SPDC, the 
performance of the WSN is affected because of additional communication and storage overhead. The 
SPDC algorithm affects the performance of data collection in WSNs. A secure routing mechanism will 
affect the performance of a WSN in different aspects like transmission delay, energy consumption, 
load  balance,  etc.  In  this  manuscript,  we  focus  on  the  impact  of  the  SPDC  algorithm  on  the 
transmission  delay  of  WSN.  We  evaluate  the  performance  of  the  algorithm  by  several  groups  of 
parameters. Table 2 shows the performance of SPDC under different groups of parameters. It can be 
seen that the overall delay of data transmission is higher when the number of the nodes in the WSN is 
larger. It is mainly because that the hop count increases when the network scale becomes large. A large 
hop count results in high transmission delay. We also note that the overall delay decreases as the times 
of transmission decrease under a fixed group of parameters. It is mainly because that the delay caused 
by  routing  path  discovery  and  secure  path  construction  is  fixed  and  independent  of  the  times  of 
transmission. Therefore, the average delay decreases when the times of transmission increase. 
Table 2. The transmission delay of SPDC under different groups of parameters. 
Number of 
Sensor Nodes 
Number of 
Compromised Nodes 
Transmission 
Times 
Average Delay (assume 
one-hop delay is 1) 
50  10  500  37 
50  10  1,000  35 
100  20  500  52 
100  20  1,000  47 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we propose a novel approach of secure data collection for WSNs. We explore secret 
sharing and multipath routing to achieve secure data collection in a WSN with compromised nodes. 
The key component of the approach is a novel tracing-feedback mechanism, which makes full use of 
the routing functionality of WSNs to improve the quality of data collection. The advantage of the 
approach is that secure paths are constructed as a by-product of data collection and are potentially safe 
for subsequent data collection. The process of constructing secure path causes little overhead to the 
sensor nodes in a WSN, while perform routing via secure paths is more secure than random multipath 
routing. Compared with the existing works in this field, the algorithms of the approach are lightweight 
to  the  resource-constrained  sensor  nodes  in  WSNa.  According  to  the  simulation  results,  the 
performance of the proposed approach is better than the other approaches with a similar purpose. In 
all, our work tries to take a step forward secure data collection for WSNs.  
Future works may include: (1) improving the efficiency of the algorithms to reduce the overhead of 
secure path notification; (2) making use of the secure paths in a local cache or database to detect 
compromised nodes and perform intrusion detection for WSNs; (3) considering a more complex WSN 
model to implement and evaluate the approach. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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